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JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE FEDERAL STATUTES
REGULATING STATE TAXATION: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT-SECTION 1341 IMBROGLIO
EXISTING limitations on the power of federal courts to entertain suits con-
testing state tax levies may nullify a recent congressional attempt to alleviate
some of the burdens on interstate commerce created by state income taxes.
Prior to 1959, the permissible scope of state power to tax income was deter-
mined by judicial interpretation of the commerce and due process clauses.'
For some forms of state taxation, such as sales, gross receipts, and franchise
taxes, the Court had generally attempted to distinguish between interstate
and local or intrastate activities of an out-of-state business, and had invalidated
those taxes levied on interstate activity.2 On a number of occasions, however,
the Supreme Court had indicated in dictum that a tax levied on net income
from an interstate transaction would not conflict with the commerce clause.
3
The first clear holding on this issue was not rendered until Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,4 decided in February of 1959. An Iowa
corporation had leased a sales office in Minnesota from which its representa-
tives solicited orders which were transmitted to the home office in Iowa for
acceptance. The Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the activities of the
taxpayer constituted interstate commerce,5 but held that this fact would not
preclude imposition of a net income tax. To support a tax on net income
derived exclusively from interstate operations, the Court required only that
the tax not discriminate against out-of-state businesses, that it be fairly appor-
1. See generally Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income From a Multistate
Business, 13 VAND. L. Rxv. 21, 23-48 (1959).
2. See generally id. at 81-109. For a time, the Supreme Court ignored this distinction
and concentrated on the question of whether the tax imposed "multiple burdens" on
commerce, e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938), but
this approach seems to have been repudiated in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
See generally Menard, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: From Form to Sub-
stance and Back Again, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 9 (1957).
3. See United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918)
(taxpayer was a domestic corporation with a manufacturing plant in the taxing state) ;
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920) (taxpayer had
manufacturing plant and storage facilities in taxing state); Memphis Natural Gas Co.
v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 656 (1942) (taxpayer had a "commercial domicile" in the tax-
ing state).
4. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Previously, the Court had affirmed without opinion a deci-
sion upholding a California net income tax levied on activities assumed to be exclusive-
ly interstate. West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946). The storage of
books by the taxpayer in the taxing state, however, might have been "intrastate" activi-
ty, capable of supporting the tax under a more restrictive doctrine. See West Publishing
Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 707, 166 P.2d 861, 862 (1946).
5. 358 U.S. at 452.
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tioned to sources within the state, and that the taxpayer's activities within the
taxing state form a "sufficient nexus" to support the tax.6 Subsequently, the
Court refused to review two decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court 7 in
which a corporate income tax was sustained solely on the basis of "regular
and systematic" solicitation of sales,8 the respective taxpayers having neither
an office, warehouse, nor property within the taxing state.
Before Northwestern States, the income tax statutes of ten states reached
"interstate" activities. 9 Subsequently, however, three more states amended or
supplemented their taxing provisions to reach businesses engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce. 10 Fearful that additional states would follow this
example and that the "sufficient nexus" requirement might be satisfied by mere
solicitation of sales in the taxing state, interstate sales organizations appealed
to Congress for relief.-1
Congress responded by enacting Public Law 86-272,12 the first exercise of
congressional power under the commerce clause to limit state taxation. 13
6. Id. at 463-64. The Court did not discuss whether the Minnesota tax subjected
the taxpayer to multiple taxation since taxpayer had not demonstrated that the formula
placed a burden upon interstate commerce. Id. at 463.
7. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d
70 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959); International Shoe
Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
8. 236 La. at 279, 107 So. 2d at 640. The term derives from International Shoe Co.
v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314 (1945), which was cited in support of West
Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946). Apparently, the Louisiana court
thought that the criteria for determining the limits of a state's jurisdiction to tax and
to serve process were identical.
9. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-102 (1956); ARK. STAT. § 84-2003 (1947); CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 23040 (Supp. 1960) ; COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-3 (1953) ; GA.
CODE ANN. § 93-3113 (1937); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.02 (Supp. 1959); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 47-31 (1950); MISS. CODE § 9220-12 (Supp. 1958); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
§ 876 (1954); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 317.010(8), 318.020 (1957). Eight of the ten were
expanded to cover interstate activity after 1946. For a historical survey, see Studenski
& Glasser, New Threat in State Business Taxation, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1958,
pp. 77-83, 85, 86.
10. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 63-3001, -3023, -3027, -3087 (Supp. 1959) ; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-2902 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-13-65, -72 (Supp. 1959).
The activity in Brown-Forman was actually less than solicitation; "missionary men"
called upon wholesalers and, on occasion, accompanied the salesmen of these whole-
salers to assist them in displaying their company's merchandise. 234 La. at 654, 101
So. 2d at 70.
11. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of Public Law 86-272, see
Note, 46 VA. L. REv. 297, 300-13 (1960).
12. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (Supp. I, 1959).
13. Congress had enacted legislation on two occasions in the past authorizing the
continuation of specific state taxes after the courts had raised the possibility of com-
merce clause conflicts. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 642 (unemployment tax) ; the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958) (taxation of in-
surance companies). Congress has also permitted and thereby regulated state taxation
of national bank shares, Rtv. STAT. § 5219 (1875) as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1958).
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Acknowledged as a stop-gap measure,14 the statute deals only with the taxa-
tion of income derived from the sale of tangible personal property. Section
101 prohibits the states from imposing a tax on the net income of any out-of-
state business whose sole activity within the taxing state is (i) the solicitation
of orders for tangible personal property to be approved and filled from outside
the state, (ii) the solicitation of orders for a client or customer if approved or
filled from outside the state, or (iii) the solicitation of orders or sale of goods
through an independent contractor.15 The sponsors of section 101 were not
directly concerned with the burden of the net income tax itself. Rather, they
feared that the expense of preparing state tax returns would prevent many small
and medium-sized businesses from developing new markets in some states and
cause them to retrench their activities in others.16
To subject these corporations to a separate income tax in each of these
States means that they will have to keep books, make returns, store
records, and engage counsel, all to meet the diverse tax laws of forty-nine
States, with their different times for filing returns, different tax struc-
tures, different modes of determining "net income," and different, often
conflicting, formulas of apportionment. This will involve large increases
in bookkeeping, accounting, and legal paraphernalia to meet these new
demands.
17
The extent to which this policy will be effectuated may depend on whether
taxpayers protected by section 101 will have access to federal courts to en-
force their statutory immunity. Congress has expressed its interest in pro-
tecting a free interstate market against intrusion by the states' taxing power.' 8
Commentators have suggested that where such a fundamental conflict of feder-
al and state interests exists initial federal jurisdiction is required to protect
14. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.'5 (1959).
15. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. I, 1959). Section 102, 73 Stat. 556
(1959) 15 U.S.C. § 382 (Supp. I 1959) invalidates any such taxes for prior years unless
they have already been assessed. For an example of similar but probably distinguishable
retroactive regulation of state taxation, see Maricopa County v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 318
U.S. 357 (1943) (tax on national bank shares); cf. Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 163
F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1948), followed in Moss v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 187 F.2d 442,
447 (9th Cir. 1951) (retroactive portal-to-portal pay statute). Section 103 extends
the statute to any state tax measured by net income, e.g., a franchise tax. But this
extension would seem irrelevant since franchise taxes on "interstate" activity have
been declared unconstitutional. See Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S.
602 (1951). Title II of the act lays the groundwork for study of more comprehensive
legislation to deal with the multiplicity of state income tax statutes. 73 Stat. 556 (1959).
16. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1959).
17. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 474
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), cited frequently in the congressional hearings and
debates, e.g., Hearings on SJ. Res. 113, S. 2213, S. 2281 Before the Senate Committee
on Finance, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1959). For a discussion of the multitude of
formulae presently used, and suggested reforms, see Studenski & Glasser, supra note 9.
18. See S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1959); Studenski, State Taxes
Threaten U.S. Common Market, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jul.-Aug. 1960, p. 57.
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the congressional program. 19 Presumably, federal court judges are more likely
than state court judges to give due weight to the national interests involved.
This tendency would seem particularly important when federal legislation as
imprecise as the present statute is involved, since the role of the courts in de-
fining the national interest is accordingly made greater.20 Moreover, if any
state court bias against out-of-state litigants still exists, it seems certain to be
evoked by the situation presented in a suit under section 101: an out-of-state
business, enjoying the "market benefits" of the taxing state, will be seeking to
avoid paying the same taxes which are paid by local businesses.
21
In addition, refinement of the new minimal activities standard of section
101 by state courts is not likely to yield the certainty and predictability which
Congress expressly intended to provide. The scope and meaning of such im-
precise but pivotal terms as "solicitation of sales," "tangible personal prop-
erty," and "independent contractor," may vary from state to state.22 This
result would place upon out-of-state businesses the expense of determining
their liability on a state-by-state basis, and shaping their sales operations ac-
cordingly. Where this expense is prohibitive, out-of-state businesses may cur-
tail their operations rather than take the risk of back assessments and statu-
tory penalties if they do not file.23 Of course, diverse state interpretations
might be reconciled and general guide-lines provided by appeal to the Supreme
Court. Because of the infinite variety of complex business operations which may
be governed by this statute, however, the relative infrequency and necessary
generality of Supreme Court pronouncements may render such review of little
value. Practical uniformity and predictability must be achieved at a lower level,
and can best be achieved in the lower federal courts. Even if conflicts among
circuits are not immediately resolved by the Supreme Court, the circuit court
decisions themselves will cover a greater geographical area than state court
decisions. Although the taxpayer's business may extend beyond a single cir-
cuit, he will still contend with fewer autonomous jurisdictions than he would
if he had to ascertain his tax liability in each state.
Since the act makes no provision for enforcing the immunity, taxpayers are
presumably free to bring suit in either state or federal courts. There are several
grounds under which federal jurisdiction might be obtained initially. Federal
19. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 61
n.22, 189-91 (1928) ; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 157, 158-59, 195-96 (1953).
20. See Mishkin, supra note 19, at 167.
21. See the arguments advanced by state tax administrators in Roland, Public Law
86-272: Regulation or Raid, 46 VA. L. REv. 1172, 1189 (1960).
22. For a discussion of the ambiguities of the "solicitation-plus" requirement of
section 101, see Dane, State Taxation of Interstate Income: Congress Takes Historic
Action, 12 THE TAx EXECUTIVE 18 (October 1959); Note, 46 VA. L. REv. 297, 313-19
(1960).
23. For list of states requiring the filing of returns and the penalties they levy for
noncompliance, see Tables XXIII and XXIV in BLAKEY & JOHNSON, STATE INCOME
TAXEs 92 (1942).
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question jurisdiction of section 1331 of the Judicial Code 24 is available, but it
is subject to two limitations. First, since the federal question must be set out
in the complaint,2 5 the out-of-state business must initiate the action in the dis-
trict court; an action brought in a state court to collect the tax would not be
removable.2 r A second and more serious burden is created by a 1958 amendment
raising the amount in controversy requirement of section 1331 from $3,000 to
$10,000.27 In tax suits, most courts have held that the assessment itself must
satisfy the minimum jurisdictional amount; penalties and claims of loss of busi-
ness are generally irrelevant. 28 Since few states have corporate income tax rates
in excess of five per cent of apportioned net income,29 only those businesses
whose net income attributed to the taxing state exceeded $200,000 could qualify
for federal relief.30 The problem of alleging a sufficient amount in contro-
versy will be avoided if jurisdiction of claims arising under section 101 is
grounded in section 1337 of the Judicial Code,31 which provides original
federal jurisdiction irrespective of the amount in controversy of a civil action
arising under any act of Congress regulating commerce. Since Public Law
86-272 was enacted with the express purpose of relieving interstate commerce
of burdensome tax regulations, there is no reason to believe that section 1337
jurisdiction will not be available.
32
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
25. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) ; First Nat'l
Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504 (1920); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908).
26. Since all taxpayers affected by the new federal law will be citizens of another
state for diversity purposes, federal diversity jurisdiction on removal would be available
under section 1332 of the Judicial Code provided suit were brought against the taxpayer
by the Tax Commissioner in his personal capacity. If suit is brought in the name of the
state, this jurisdictional ground is foreclosed since states are not citizens for purposes of
diversity. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482 (1894).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958). This limitation also applies to diversity jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
28. See, e.g., Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939) ; Royalty Serv. Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles, 98 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir. 1938). Cases in which additions to the
assessment figure have been allowed have turned generally on the unavailability of pro-
visions in the taxing statute enabling the taxpayer to pay under protest and thus escape
statutory penalties for noncompliance. See, e.g., White Cleaners & Dyers v. Hughes, 7 F.
Supp. 1017 (W.D. La. 1934) ; Annot., 109 A.L.R. 300, 314 (1937).
29. See Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Blesincss,
13 VAND. L. REv. 21, app. at 127 (1959) (Table I).
30. The amount of the tax could, of course, include several years' taxes.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958).
32. Courts have applied § 1337 to include actions arising under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, Tolliver v. Cudahy Packing Co., 39 F. Supp. 337, 338 (E.D. Tenn. 1941).
The Tennessee Valley Authority Act, Grant v. TVA, 44 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Tenn.
1941), and the Federal Communications Act, Albuquerque Broadcast. Co. v. Regents of
New Mexico College, 70 F. Supp. 198, 201 (D.N.M. 1945), among others. Whether the
jurisdictional grant of § 1337 embraces all acts of Congress passed pursuant to its power
under the commerce clause is questionable. One federal court has assumed, without decid-
ing the issue, that the scope of the phrase "act regulating commerce" is to be construed
[Vol. 70:636
STATE TAXATION
The power of federal courts to grant appropriate remedies, however, is
doubtful. Suits for refund, the principal remedy afforded by state taxing sta-
tutes, 33 cannot usually be brought in a federal court. The eleventh amendment
deprives federal courts of original jurisdiction over suits against a state by
citizens of another state. Whether the state or the taxing official is the named
defendant, suits for refund have been construed as actions against the state
itself 3 4 on the theory that this action compels the state to deplete its treasury. 35
The only major exception to the applicability of the eleventh amendment in this
area would be refund suits brought to recover municipal or county income
taxes, since those subdivisions are not considered the state for this purpose.3 6
Only one state taxing statute expressly waives state immunity from suit in a
federal court.3 7 Although some other states permit the taxpayer to sue for a
more strictly than that of the commerce clause. Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121
F.2d 285, 286 (6th Cir. 1941).
33. Of the thirty-one corporate net income tax statutes, the following thirteen pro-
vide for judicial review only after payment under protest or the posting of a bond: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 84-2038 (1947); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 26101-07 (1956); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 63-3049 (Supp. 1959); IowA CODE ANN. § 422.29 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 79-2005 (1949) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 134.580 (1953) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.50
(1947); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9220-36 (1942); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-41 (1953); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-11-35 (1957); S.C. CODE § 65-2651 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-2303 to -2306 (1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-13-43 to -46 (1953). The remaining
eighteen state statutes generally also allow the taxpayer to appeal the initial assessment
or deficiency assessment prior to payment. See, e.g., ARiz. R.EV. STAT. ANN. § 43-184
(1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1903 (Supp. 1958).
34. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 579
(1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463 (1945); Great
No. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944).
35. See cases cited note 34 supra. The fact that protest payments are put in a separate
fund is not material. Great No. Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944).
36. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); City of Memphis v. Ingram,
195 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Dunnuck v. Kansas State Highway Comm'n, 21 F. Supp.
882 (D. Kan. 1937).
It might be argued that suit under a bond is distinct from suits for refund, because
no depletion of the state treasury is involved, and that such suits are also exempt.
37. LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:1576 (1950):
This section will be construed to provide a legal remedy in the state or federal
courts, by action at law, in case such taxes are claimed to be an unlawful burden
upon interstate commerce, or the collection thereof, in violation of any Act of Con-
gress or the United States Constitution, or the Constitution of the State of Louisi-
ana, or in any case where jurisdiction is vested in any of the courts of the United
States.
Despite the apparent clarity of this section, jurisdiction of the Louisiana federal courts
is at issue in Superior Oil Co. v. Cocreham, Civ. Nos. 2157, 2159, E.D. La. See letter to
Yale Law Journel From La. Dep't of Revenue, Dec. 7, 1960, on file in Yale Law Library.
Twenty-three state constitutions make no provision concerning immunity from suit;
thirteen require specific legislative consent to suit; four specifically prohibit suit in any
situation, but there an agency such as a Board of Claims makes recommendations to the
legislature which issues warrants against the State treasury. See Comment, States-Waiver
of State Immunity to Suit with Special Reference to Suits in Federal Courts, 45 MicH.
L. REv. 348, 354 nn.26-28 (1947).
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refund in any court of "competent jurisdiction,"3 8 the Supreme Court has re-
fused to construe this phrase as a waiver of immunity, declaring that consent
to be sued in a federal court would not be presumed unless explicitly stated.30
Although the doctrine of consent might be modified to require the states ex-
plicitly to bar federal jurisdiction, the ultimate power to defeat federal juris-
diction remains with the states.
Unlike the refund remedy, injunctive relief is not barred by the eleventh
amendment; suits for injunction have been regarded as suits against the tax
official in his personal capacity and not as suits against the state or its agent.
40
Ordinarily, injunctive relief will issue where there is no "plain, adequate and
complete" remedy available at law in the federal courts.41 In Matthews v.
Rodgers4 2 however, the Supreme Court noted that a more limiting principle
prevails in suits brought to contest a state tax levy:
The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments
which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluc-
tance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that
such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right
may be preserved without it.4
According to the rule of comity formulated in the Matthews case, federal
courts will not enjoin state tax officials where the taxpayer has an adequate
remedy, for example, a suit for refund, in the state courts.4 This doctrine has
been justified on the ground that injunctions disrupt state fiscal administration
by postponing anticipated payments, thus depleting current state revenues and
placing the burden of taxpayer insolvency upon the state.4 5
38. E.g., ARX. STAT. ANN. § 84-2038 (1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2005
(1949); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-41 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2931 (1955).
39. See cases cited supra note 34. See also Comment, supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155 (1908) ; Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378, 393 (1932).
41. E.g., Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935) ; Stratton
v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 284 U.S. 530, 533 (1932).
42. 284 U.S. 521 (1932).
43. Id. at 525.
44. E.g., Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U.S. 121 (1930); Arkansas Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Madden, 175 U.S. 269 (1899). The pre-1937 courts, however, were
easily persuaded that the state remedy was inadequate where relief was uncertain, expen-
sive, or would require a number of suits. E.g., Green v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 119 F.2d
466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 637 (1941) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 688 (1936).
Some post-Matthews cases have applied the earlier equity doctrine which requires only
the absence of adequate relief in federal courts. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Corbett, 20 F.
Supp. 940, 944 (N.D. Cal. 1937), aff'd without discussion of this issue sub non. Southern
Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); Fort Worth v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
80 F.2d 972, 973 (5th Cir. 1936).




The withholding of equitable relief, discretionary under the Matthews doc-
trine, was rendered mandatory in 1937 by section 1341 of the Judicial Code,
which provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment
levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state.46
In substituting "plain, speedy and efficient" for the "adequacy" standard of
the Matthews case, Congress apparently intended to limit the availability of
injunctive relief even further.
47
Nevertheless, section 1341 may not be as insuperable a barrier to federal
court injunctions under section 101 as its text might suggest. The existence of
section 1337 as a specific enactment supplementing the general grant of federal
question jurisdiction emphasizes the particular importance of giving federal
courts jurisdiction to interpret commerce clause legislation. 48 Section 1341 is
inconsistent with this policy, because the bar against injunctive relief may en-
tirely deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to hear suits under section 101.
The conflict between sections 1337 and 1341 can be reconciled by finding that
section 1341 and, consequently, the less formidable Matthews doctrine, were
never intended to bar suits brought under a federal statute or to preclude
federal interpretation of commerce clause legislation. 49 At the time section
46. 50 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
47. One may infer from the Senate Report that the right to have a full hearing and
judicial determination of the issues in the state courts, regardless of the nature of the
remedy provided, would defeat federal jurisdiction. S. REP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1937). Similarly, lower federal court decisions in cases initiated shortly after
the enactment of the 1937 act indicate that a significant change in the pre-1937 standard
was intended. See, e.g., Adams County v. Northern Pac. Ry., 115 F.2d 768, 774 (9th Cir.
1940); Printers & Publishers Corp. v. Corbett, 25 F. Supp. 369, 370 (S.D. Cal. 1938),
rev'd on other grounds, 127 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1942). But see Note, 59 HARv. L. Rxv.
780, 784, 785 (1946) (Supreme Court has treated the new standard as a mere codification
of the prior equity standard).
Section 1341 will not be applied if the state procedure is extraordinarily burdensome,
Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952) (taxpayer would have to
file over 300 complaints) ; if the taxing authority is judgment proof, Adams County v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 115 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1940) ; and when the tax levy conflicted with
bankruptcy jurisdiction, Board of Directors v. Kurn, 98 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1938); cf.
Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 139 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
795 (1944) (United States a party).
48. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
49. When we ask what Congress intended usually there can be no answer, if what
we mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as
we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the
position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would
have dealt with the concrete occasion.
United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 345 U.S.
979 (1953) (Hand, J.). For the use of such "historical perspective" in resolving a con-
flict between the anti-injunction provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70
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1341 was enacted federal statutes regulating state taxation did not exist and
were probably not anticipated. Examination of the legislative history of sec-
tion 1341 reveals that Congress was disturbed primarily by suits brought into
federal courts on diversity grounds to secure injunctive relief not available in
state courts. Aside from the anomaly that foreign corporations could secure
injunctive relief while local businesses could not,5° state courts were consis-
tently deprived of control over issues of taxing policy which were predomi-
.nantly of state interest.51
Comparison of section 1341 with the similar anti-injunction provisions of
section 1342, enacted three years before, might suggest the opposite conclu-
sion-that Congress also intended to bar federal equity jurisdiction based on
commerce clause questions. Section 1342 (The Johnson Act), prohibits the
issuance of federal court injunctions to suspend rate orders of state public
utility commissions where there is a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy in
the courts of the state.52 The act expressly does not apply to suits involving
orders which interfere with interstate commerce.53 Since the draftsmen of
1341 were aware of the Johnson Act, considering it "a statute of similar im-
port,' ' 54 their failure to include the commerce clause exception can be taken
as evidence that Congress was not willing to assert the federal interest in com-
merce clause matters when state taxes were involved.
(1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958), and section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958), see Judge Magruder's opinion in General
Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 244 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547
(1957). See also, Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14-35 (1957).
50. If those to whom the Federal courts are open may secure injunctive relief against
the collection of taxes, the highly unfair picture is presented of the citizen of the
State being required to pay first and then litigate, while those privileged to sue in
Federal courts need only pay what they choose and withhold the balance during
the period of litigation.
S. RP No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
51. This is indicated in the report of the Committee on the Judiciary on the John-
son Act, which was read into the record by the sponsor of the 1937 act as particularly
relevant to the latter bill:
[W]hen a State question arises under a State statute, why not let the courts of
that State settle the controversy, whether the controversy is between citizens of one
State or citizens of two different States? Why not be logical and let the State
courts try controversies arising under State laws within their borders instead of
permitting a few privileged persons who do business in a State to take contro-
versies into Federal courts and thus burden Federal judges with the settlement of
State questions and the control of lawsuits arising entirely and solely out of con-
troversies under State laws.
81 CONG. REc. 1417 (1937).
52. 48 Stat. 775 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
53. Injunctions are barred only where the rate "order does not interfere with inter-
state commerce." Ibid.
$4. S. REP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
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In the absence of any commerce legislation affecting state taxing power,
however, this omission indicates only that Congress was willing to withdraw
federal jurisdiction over constitutional issues raised under the commerce
clause. Since the policy of section 1337 applies specifically to commerce legis-
lation, the intent to restrict the federal courts' constitutional jurisdiction is not
directly relevant. The distinction between statutory and constitutional juris-
diction is particularly meaningful in the context of the federal courts' equity
powers. The power to issue injunctions based on broad constitutional provi-
sions is likely to afford appointed Federal judges an opportunity to impose
their personal policy views on the parties involved-the so-called "government
by injunction" against which Congress reacted during this period by passing
several statutes similar to section 1341. 55 Injunctions based on congressional
statutes, on the other hand, are more likely to reflect specific national policies
formulated through a legislative process in which the states are represented.5 6
Since statutorily derived injunctions may for this reason be a less offensive
extension of federal authority, they should not be barred on the basis of an
inference drawn from section 1341's presumed denial of constitutional juris-
diction to enjoin.
55. In addition to §§ 1341 and 1342, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47
Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958), which removed federal courts
from a similar policy-making position assumed under common law doctrines and the
Sherman Act. See Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 70 (1960).
56. Another argument for allowing injunctive relief might be made on the basis of
§ 101's policy to shield interstate businesses from the excessive costs of complying with
the multiplicity of state income tax laws. See note 18 supra. Out-of-state businesses con-
testing the assessment of a state income tax in state courts may incur burdensome com-
plance costs even if they prevail. This is because many states require taxpayers to file a
return, exhaust its remedies before state administrative bodies, pay the tax under pro-
test, and then sue for a refund in state courts. See note 33 supra. To pay under protest,
however, a business must go to the expense of analyzing business records to compute
its tax base according to the taxing state's formula and to ascertain the income attributable
to that state. Since the § 101 immunity from taxation was intended to alleviate such
costs, it would seem anomalous to require businesses to incur these costs as a prerequisite
to its judicial enforcement. Compliance costs, albeit exorbitant ones, were recognized as a
valid consideration under § 1341 in Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S.
299 (1952). Cf. Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956) (licensing
tax placing heavy financial burden on labor union enjoined despite the availability of re-
fund procedure).
On the other hand, the cost of preparing returns for the purpose of litigation will occur
only once for the immune business, and thus would not seem to be of the same propor-
tions as the costs of continual bookkeeping and computation envisaged by Congress.
Moreover, the allowance of an injunction might not relieve the compliance cost burden.
The taxpayer may still face the requirement that it exhaust its administrative appeals.
See, e.g., Gorham Mfg. Co. v. New York, 266 U.S. 265 (1924); First Nat'l Bank v.
Weld County, 264 U.S. 450 (1924) ; cf. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210
(1908). Although some commentators have argued that the "exhaustion" doctrine should
not apply when questions not amenable to administrative determination are involved, see,
e.g., Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to Administra-
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Arguably, taxpayers might evade section 1341's restrictions upon injunc-
tive relief altogether by bringing a declaratory judgment action. This argu-
ment is grounded in a comparison of the legislative histories of section 1341
and section 2201 of the Judicial Code, the federal Declaratory Judgment
Act. 5 7 Enacted in 1934, section 2201 did not originally exclude either federal
or state tax actions from its operation. But in 1935 the act was amended and
federal tax contests were expressly excluded. 8 The text of 1341, moreover, en-
acted two years after section 2201 was amended, literally excludes only injunc-
tions. Presumably, then, declaratory judgments are available to determine tax
liability. On the other hand, a declaration of taxpayer's liability imposes no
less effective a form of interference than the injunction, and therefore would
seem to be equally repugnant to the policy underlying section 1341. Lower
federal courts have rendered conflicting rulings on this question.5 9 The Su-
preme Court, expressly declining to decide the section 1341 issue, has ruled
that declaratory judgments are governed by general equitable principles; ex-
tensively citing the Matthews case, it held that a federal* court in the exercise
of sound discretion should decline to give a declaratory judgment on the valid-
ity of a state tax when adequate state court relief is available.60 Thus, except
for the possibly less stringent standards of the Matthews doctrine, declara-
tory judgment suits under section 101 are subject to essentially the same
limitations as injunctive relief governed by section 1341.
Federal jurisdiction over section 101 claims may be liable to a serious
defect-delay occasioned by the practice of remitting suits to state courts to
determine a question of state law. Although the remission practice has been
tive Remedies, 28 MIcH. L. REv. 637, 662 (1930), recent Supreme Court decisions seem
inhospitable to such a limitation, see George F. Alger Co. v. Peck, 74 Sup. Ct. 605
(March 29, 1954). In any event, the necessity of determining the peculiar facts of each
taxpayer's business operations would seem to be a matter for administrative competence.
If the exhaustion doctrine does apply, the taxpayer will probably have to file his
return before he can pursue his administrative appeals, since most state procedures begin
with an audit of the return and assessment. See, e.g., Letters to the Yale Law Journal
From Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, and Colorado Dept. of Revenue, on file in Yale Law
Library, Dec. 1960. Since computation rather than payment of the tax is the source of
the burdensome cost, nothing would be gained by granting an injunction rather than a
suit for refund.
57. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958).
58. 49 Stat. 1027 (1935), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
59. For cases holding § 1341 applicable to declaratory actions, see West Publishing
Co. v. McColgan, 138 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Collier Advertising Serv. Inc. v. City
of New York, 32 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See also Note, 59 HARv. L. REv. 780.
Contra, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 35 F. Supp. 553 (D. Wyo.
1940).
Similarly inconsistent positions have been adopted by the courts regarding the appli-
cability of § 1342 to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Compare Mississippi Power
& Light Co. v. City of Jackson, 9 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss. 1935), with Mississippi Power
& Light Co. v. City of Jackson, 116 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 698 (1941).
60. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300 (1943).
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implemented most frequently to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions,61
it has recently been employed in a diversity case to obtain a state court inter-
pretation of an ambiguous state statute.0 2 Since most state statutes define
jurisdiction to tax in typically broad-gauged and ambiguous "doing business"
terms, 3 each new variety of local activity presents a new problem of statu-
tory definition and, consequently, invites remission where suit is brought in
a federal court. The delay occasioned by the remission practice was illus-
trated in the extreme by Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor 64 in
which the taxpayer contesting a state franchise tax finally prevailed eight
years and eight decisions after filing suit.0 5
Remission would appear generally inappropriate to suits brought under
section 101, however, since the purpose of staying federal jurisdiction pend-
ing a statutory interpretation by the state does not apply to the peculiar am-
biguities of the "doing business" criteria. At least one state court has con-
strued broad language in similar clauses as expressing legislative intent to
extend jurisdiction as far as due process will allow.66 Testimony of many tax
officials reveals the same purpose in "doing business" clauses. 67 Moreover, even
if the dependence on federal law is not made explicit, most state decisions in
this area confine the question of law to an interpretation of relevant Supreme
Court decisions.08 Practically, therefore, the only statute to be construed will
61. See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959) ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest
Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 173 (1942); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500 (1941).
62. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); see
Note, 69 YALE LJ. 643 (1960).
63. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3113 (1958):
Every such corporation shall be deemed to be doing business within the State if
it engages within this State in any activities or transactions for the purpose of fi-
nancial profit or gain, whether or not such corporation qualifies to do business
within this State, and whether or not it maintains an office or place of doing busi-
ness within this State, and whether or not any such activity or transaction is con-
nected with interstate or foreign commerce.
For a compilation of operative state provisions, see 20 CCH STAT. TAx RV. No. 35,
40-62 (Sept. 3, 1959).
64. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
65. Id. at 614.
66. Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 431, 158 N.E.2d 73, 76 (1959);
Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957).
67. See, e.g., Regulation 4, Arkansas Department of Revenues:
The words "doing business" as used in section 2(b) . . . shall be deemed to mean
the carrying on of any income-producing activity, whether or not the corporation
maintains an established place of business with the State.
Cited in 20 CCH STATE TAX REviEW No. 35, 42 (Sept. 3, 1959). See generally, id. 40-62.
68. Minnesota v. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., 250 Minn. 32, 84 N.W.2d
373, 379-80 (1957); Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc. v. Williams, 213 Ga. 713, 101
S.E.2d 197 (1957); Fontenot v. John I. Hay Co., 228 La. 1031, 24 So. 2d 810 (1955);
West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, 866 (1944).
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be section 101 of the federal act itself, a function more properly that of the
federal courts.
If the doctrine of remission is applied despite these considerations, federal
courts might well take a different view of the policies in favor of federal
jurisdiction which may be argued to avoid section 1341 and the Matthews
doctrine. The possibility that taxpayers will suffer inordinate delays will
probably destroy whatever advantages federal jurisdiction might otherwise
afford, especially since taxpayers suing under section 101 are likely to be
small and medium sized businesses which cannot afford the expense of ex-
tended litigation.
Questions of jurisdiction under the present act will assume greater import-
ance if Congress undertakes a comprehensive reform of state income tax
procedures. Title II of the present act directs the House Judiciary and
Senate Finance Committees to study this problem and to report to Congress
in 1962.69 To avoid the problems raised under the present statute by the
eleventh amendment and the resulting conflict between sections 1337 and
1341, Congress should deal explicitly with enforcement procedures in any
subsequent legislation affecting state taxes. Whether a federal forum should
be provided may depend on the manner in which such enforcement provisions
are drafted. If the eleventh amendment is taken as an unavoidable obstacle to
suits for refund in a federal court, Congress will be forced to authorize equit-
able relief, probably by creating an explicit exception to section 1341. If this
were the only alternative, the cost of a federal forum might be considered too
great in terms of the interference with state fiscal administration. It may be
possible, however, to leave this problem to the states themselves. The feder-
al statute could be drafted to allow injunctive relief only when the state has
not explicitly consented to suits for refund in the federal courts. From the
standpoint of the states, suits for refund would probably be preferable since
they are less disruptive of state revenue collection, and the state statute con-
senting to be sued could limit consent to the specific "refund suits required by
the federal statute.
69. 73 Stat. 556 (1959).
